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Abstractors
Richard K. Janger* and Alan H. Swanson*
Access to Courtroom-Atlanta Newspapers v.
Grimes, 114 S.E.2d 421 (Ga.1960). Plaintiffs
brought a petition against defendants, a sheriff and
the State of Georgia, alleging that an order issued
by a judge of the Superior Court, which provided
in part that no photograph of any participant in
or at any trial shall be taken at any place in the
courthouse building or on the adjacent streets, was
erroneous and invalid in that its enforcement
denied to petitioners and other members of the
public the liberty of speech and press guaranteed
by the United States and Georgia constitutions,
as well as liberty and property without due process
of law. The trial court held for the defendants and
the Court of Appeals was equally divided. The
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision,
stating that the courts have power to determine
the manner in which they shall operate in order to
administer justice with dignity and decorum in
such manner as shall be conducive to fair and
impartial trials as well as to the ascertainment of
truth uninfluenced by extraneous matters or dis-
tractions, and that liberty of the press is sub-
ordinate to the independence of the judiciary and
the proper administration of justice.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-Neely v. Slate,
164 N.E.2d 110 (Ind. 1960). Defendant was con-
victed for unlawful possession of narcotics. On
appeal, he contended that the court erred in
overruling his motion to supress as evidence nar-
cotics found during a search of defendant's car
made by police officers who had arrested him for
running a stop sign. The Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that the search of the car appeared to
have been a reasonable incident to the lawful
arrest of defendant and was properly made al-
though accomplished without a search warrant.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-State v. Mallory,
336 S.W.2d 383 (Mo. 1960). Defendant was con-
victed of burglary and larceny. On appeal, he
contended that the trial court erred in admitting
into evidence stolen merchandise discovered by
police officers who, after arresting defendant for
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"running a red light," noticed that there were
partially covered firearms within the automobile
and that the rear end of the car sagged and there-
upon ordered defen-dant to open the trunk of the
car where the stolen merchandise was found. The
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the
circumstances described, there was no unreason-
able search and seizure, and hence the stolen
merchandise was admissible.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-United States v.
Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
Defendants moved for an order to suppress as
evidence statements procured by police who with-
out warrant stopped defendants' automobiles and
directed defendants to a police station where they
were questioned and released. The District Court
denied the motion and, in holding the action was
neither an illegal arrest nor an unreasonable
search and seizure, stated defendants were not
arrested because the police did not intend to hold
any of them to answer for a crime, that statements
voluntarily given to police are admissible in
federal court, and that the stopping of defendants'
automobiles without a warrant was reasonable
because the police believed that a crime might
have been committed.
Attempt-States v. Damms, 100 N.W.2d 592
(Wis. 1960). Defendant was convicted of attempt
to commit murder in the first degree. On appeal,
he contended that since it was impossible for him
to have committed the act of murder he could not
be convicted of the offense of atlempt to commit
murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding
that, under WXis. SrAr. §939.32 (1957), defining
criminal attempt, the fact that, when defendant
pointed a gun at his wife's head and pulled the
trigger, the gun was not loaded did not absolve
him of attempted murder since the jury found
that he actually thought the gun was loaded at
the time of the act and intended and would have
committed the crime but for the unanticipated
frustration.
Confessions-Goldsmith v. United States, 277
F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1960). Defendants were con-
victed of robbery and assault with a dangerous
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weapon. On appeal, they contended that the trial
court erred in admitting evidence of their reaffirma-
tions of pre-arraignment confessions obtained
during a period of unnecessary delay, inasmuch as
the reaffirmations were the fruit of the original,
illegally obtained confessions. The Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that although the pre-
arraignment confessions, standing alone, might
have been inadmissible under the McNabb-
Mallory doctrine, such confessions were rendered
admissible by defendants' post-arraignment re-
affirmations of the original confessions, as well
as their re-enactment of the crime.
Confessions-Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S.
199 (1960). Defendant was convicted of robbery
in an Alabama state court. On certiorari, defend-
ant contended that under the fourteenth amend-
ment to the federal constitution his written con-
fession should not have been admitted during the
trial because it was involuntarily given. The
Supreme Court, reversing the conviction, held that
the evidence established the strongest probability
defendant was insane, and thus the confession
which he gave after eight or nine hours of sus-
tained interrogation in a tiny room filled with
police and in the absence of his friends or counsel
was not voluntarily given and violated his rights
under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
Confessions-People v. Pelkola, 166 N.E.2d
54 (Ill. 1960). Defendant was convicted of robbery.
On appeal, he contended that the trial court erred
in admitting, for purposes of impeachment,
testimony concerning an oral confession, because
the prosecution failed to supply defendant or his
counsel with the names and addresses of the per-
sons before whom the confession was allegedly
made, as required by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§729 (1957). Although holding the error to be
harmless, the Supreme Court stated that the
statute leaves no area of discretion to a trial court
and that the legislature intended compliance with
the notice provisions before an oral confession
could be admitted in evidence for any purpose.
Counsel-People v. Ford, 168 N.E.2d 33 (111.
1960). Defendant was convicted of murder. On
appeal, he contended that the trial court im-
properly allowed private counsel, compensated
partially by the victim's widow and partially by
the State's Attorney, to assist in the prosecution
of the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding
that there was no error inasmuch as previous
Illinois Supreme Court decisions have consistently
held that a trial court, in its discretion, may per-
mit a privately employed attorney to assist the
State's Attorney in the prosecution of a criminal
case so long as the defendant is adequately repre-
sented and is not prejudiced by the presence of
privately employed counsel.
Discovery-United States v. Sheer, 278 F.2d 65
(7th Cir. 1960). Defendants were convicted of
making false statements concerning matters
within the jurisdiction of the United States
Treasury Department. On appeal defendants
claimed that the trial court erred in refusing to
require the government to produce reports written
by two of its agents who testified at the trial. The
Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and re-
manded for new trial, holding that under the
Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. §3500(e)(1), the written
reports were "statements" made by government
witnesses and were admissible for impeachment
purposes though not made contemporaneously
with the events to which they referred.
Discovery-Karp v. United Stales, 277 F.2d 843
(8th Cir. 1960). Defendant was convicted of bank
robbery involving a federally insured bank. On
appeal, defendant claimed that the trial court
erred in refusing to require the government to
produce prior statements written by an F.B.I.
agent who testified. Although the Court of Ap-
peals held the error to be harmless, it rejected the
government's contention that "statements" under
the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. §3500(e)(1), are limited
to statements given to an agent by a non-govern-
ment person, and held that the report of one
government agent to another government agent
covering an interview with a defendant is a state-
ment within the meaning of the Act.
Double Jeopardy--Northcott v. Hand, 352 P.2d
450 (Kan. 1960). On October 25, 1958, petitioner
was placed on parole by the Osage County Court
for a term of two years. On January 10, 1959, his
parole was revoked and he was committed to the
penitentiary. On April 29, 1959, he was granted a
writ of habeas corpus by another district court
and discharged from the penitentiary on the ground
that the Osage County Court failed to afford him
a hearing and an opportunity to show cause why
his parole should not be revoked. On May 18, 1959,
he appeared before the Osage County Court once
more and was found to have violated his parole,
whereupon he was again committed to the peni-
tentiary. He then sought a writ of habeas corpus
[Vol. 51
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in the Supreme Court, contending that he had
been subjected to double jeopardy by the last
commitment order. The Supreme Court denied
the writ, holding that a discharge on habeas
corpus, being merely from custody and not from
the penalty, does not operate as an acquittal and
is not a bar to subsequent proceedings irrespective
of whether the individual has undergone any part
of the punishment imposed.
Embezzlement-State v. Lawrence, 168 N.E.2d
21 (Ohio 1960). Defendant, on trial on a charge of
embezzlement, contended that since he was the
operator of his own collection agency he could not
be considered an "agent" within the meaning of
the word as used in Oto REv. CODE ANN. §2907.34
(Baldwin 1958) which provides that no "agent"
shall embezzle anything of value which comes into
his possession by virtue of his employment. The
Common Pleas Court held that the legislature
used the word "agent" in the ordinary or popular
sense of one who does something for and on behalf
of another, and therefore defendant, technically an
independent contractor, was nevertheless an
"agent" within the meaning of the embezzlement
statute.
Felony Murder-People v. Wood, 167 N.E.2d
736 (N.Y. 1960). Defendant was indicted for
murder, but his indictment was dismissed. On
appeal, the State contended that N.Y. PEN. LAw
§1044 (defining murder in the first degree as "the
killing of a human being... committed ...
without a design to effect death, by a person
engaged in the commission of, or in an attempt to
commit, a felony.... .") should be interpreted so
as to hold defendant guilty of murder in the first
degree where a bystander and one of defendant's
companions were killed by a party assisting an
officer who was attempting to restore order after
defendant and his companions had feloniously
assaulted two others. The Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that the homicides, having been
committed neither by defendant's own hand nor
by someone acting in concert with him, could not
actually or constructively be attributed to him.
Felony Murder-People v. Mason, 4 Cal. Rptr.
841 (1960). Defendant was convicted of murder in
the first degree. On appeal, he contended that the
giving of a felony murder instruction was errone-
ous inasmuch as the burglary he committed, if any,
was completed upon defendant's entry into his
victim's house and that therefore the killing about
20 hours later while he was still in the house was
not committed in the perpetration of a burglary.
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that al-
though the killing occurred about 20 hours after
defendant entered- the house, if the jury found
that he committed burglary by entering the house
with the intent to commit a felonious assault, the
homicide and the burglary were parts of one con-
tinuous transaction.
Informers-People ti. Amos, 5 Cal. Rptr. 451
(Cal. 1960). Defendant moved to set aside an
information against him and the motion was
granted. On appeal by the State, the prosecution
contended that an informer's statement that he
had obtained marijuana from defendant provided
reasonable cause for the police to search the
defendant even though the informer had not
previously furnished information to the police.
The District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding
that, even though marijuana was discovered in
defendant's clothes, the search of defendant was
unlawful because the information upon which the
police acted was furnished by a person whose
reliability had not been established and therefore
probable cause for the arrest or search of defendant
was not established.
Informers-People v. Hammond, 4 Cal. Rptr.
887 (Cal. 1960). Defendant was convicted of a
narcotics violation. On appeal, he contended that
even though competent evidence established his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt he was still en-
titled to a reversal which would terminate the
proceeding and effect his complete discharge
because the identity of the informer who, by
participating in narcotics violations with the de-
fendant, led police to his capture was not revealed
to him at a preliminary hearing, and therefore he
was deprived of the informer's testimony which
might have been helpful to his defense, the in-
formant having died shortly after the preliminary
hearing. The District Court of Appeal affirmed,
holding that nothing in the record indicated that
defendant was prejudiced and no showing was
made that would in any way justify an inference
that the informer's availability at trial might have
aided his defense or weakened the prosecution's
case. (One judge dissented.)
Juries-Lewis v. State, 336 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.
1960). Defendant was convicted of driving while
intoxicated. On appeal, he contended that he
should have been granted a new trial because the
officer in charge of the jury during their delibera-
tions informed the jurors in effect that they would
19611
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have to forego lunch or refreshments until they
reached a verdict and two jurors testified that
this might have caused them to change their vote
so that a verdict could be agreed upon. The
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, holding that
the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in over-
ruling the motion for a new trial because the
officer's statement to the jurors was not such as to
require the granting of a new trial and further-
more because a juror is not allowed to impeach or
explain his verdict by showing the reason for the
conclusion he reached.
Jurisdiction to Try Cause-Bundy v. United
States, 277 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1960). Defendant
was convicted of conspiring to utter and deal in
counterfeit securities. On appeal, defendant
claimed that since, at the time of his trial, he had
been arrested for the identical offense and bail had
been set by another United States District Court,
the present District Court lacked jurisdiction to
indict, try, and convict him. The Court of Ap-
peals, affirming the conviction, held that the
present court had jurisdiction inasmuch as no
indictment had been returned by the other court
when defendant was tried.
Jury Instructions--Commonwealh v. Conklin,
160 A.2d 566 (Pa. 1960). Defendant was convicted
of murder in the first degree. On appeal, she con-
tended that the trial judge erred in his instructions
by failing to inform the jury on the possible verdict
of "not guilty." The Supreme Court vacated the
judgment and remanded for a new trial, holding
that neither the admission of facts by the de-
fendant nor her failure to deny the killing serves
to relieve the prosecution of its burden of proof,
and it is therefore necessary adequately to remind
the jury in the charge that if the prosecution's
evidence fails to convince them beyond a reason-
able doubt on any essential element of the prose-
cution's case they must return a verdict of "not
guilty." (Two judges dissented.)
Nolo Contendere Plea-United States v. Bag-
liore, 182 F.Supp. 714 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). De-
fendant was indicted by a federal grand jury for
receiving stolen property. Defendant petitioned
the court to accept a plea of nolo contendere on
the grounds that although he was now competent
to understand the proceedings and to assist coun-
sel, he had been under psychiatric treatment since
1951. The District Court granted the plea stating
that in view of defendant's medical history, he
should be afforded the plea's benefits.
Pre-Sentence Investigation Reports-State ,'.
Pohlabel, 160 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1960). Movant's
motion to vacate an allegedly illegal and im-
proper sentence was denied. On appeal, he con-
tended that the trial judge, in imposing the
sentence, misapprehended the contents of a pre-
sentence investigation report and was influenced
by inaccurate and misleading information con-
tained therein. The Superior Court reversed and
remanded, holding that, although there is no
court rule or statute in New Jersey requiring
that pre-sentence reports be shown to a defendant
or his counsel, movant had a right to be relieved
since he showed that he was probably prejudiced
when the sentencing judge acted under a material
misapprehension of fact as to movant's criminal
record and that sufficient doubt had been cast upon
the legality of the imposition of sentence as to
require the vacation thereof and appropriate
resentencing in light of a new pre-sentence investi-
gation report.
Public Trial-Lezine v. United States, 80 Sup.
Ct. 1038 (1960). Defendant was convicted of
criminal contempt for refusing to answer questions
before a grand jury on the ground of self-incrimi-
nation after he had been granted immunity from
prosecution and before a district court where the
courtroom had been cleared upon defendant's
request and had not been reopened for the render-
ing of the decision. On certiorari, defendant
claimed that the secret court proceedings violated
his rights under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment and/or his right to a public trial
under the sixth amendment to the federal consti-
tution. The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four
decision, affirmed the conviction holding that sum-
mary conviction and sentencing occurring without
the public returning to the courtroom does not
violate the Constitution when defendant has not
requested a public hearing after waiving same.
Mr. Justice Black, with the Chief Justice and Mr.
Justice Douglas joining, said that the defendant
had requested reopening of the courtroom by
requesting a trial according to due process. Mr.
Justice Brennan, also dissenting, with Mr. Justice
Douglas again joining, added that a defendant may
waive his constitional rights only when it is based
on clear consent and such consent was lacking
here.
Right to Counsel-People v. DiBiasi, 166
N.E.2d 825 (N.Y. 1960). Defendant was con-
victed of murder in the first degree and attempted
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murder in the first degree. On appeal, he contended
that the trial court erred in permitting a police
officer to testify to statements and admissions
made by defendant in the absence of his attorney
during a period of questioning after his indictment
and surrender for arraignment. The Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that this questioning
was a violation of his constitutional right to
counsel and that the entry in evidence, over
objection, of his admissions made during that
questioning was so gross an error as to require
reversal. Three judges dissented.
Right to Counsel-Hudson v. North Carolina,
80 Sup. Ct. 1314 (1960). Defendant was convicted
of robbery in a North Carolina state court. On
certiorari, defendant, who was eighteen years of
age, urged that the trial court's refusal to appoint
counsel after co-defendant's lawyer withdrew was
a deprivation of defendant's rights under the
fourteenth amendment because of his comparative
youth. The Supreme Court held that failure to
appoint counsel had deprived defendant of his
constitutional rights, not because of his youth,
but because the trial court failed to instruct the
jury that a co-defendant's plea of guilty should
not imply defendant's guilt and that defendant, a
layman, could not be expected to request such an
instruction. Mr. Justice Clark, with Mr. Justice
Whittaker concurring, dissented because the
ground for the majority's opinion was not raised
by defendant on appeal and because the majority
had merely speculated as to the prejudice resulting
from co-defendant's plea of guilty.
Search and Seizure-People v. Gonzales, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 920 (Cal. 1960). Defendant was convicted
of possession of marijuana. On appeal, he con-
tended that narcotics found in his clothing (in the
presence of a policeman) by doctors treating him
in a hospital for a knife wound were discovered
during an unlawful search and therefore were in-
admissible as evidence. The Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that the search was reasonable
in light of the fact that a hospital is required by
statute to make a record of each of its patients and
to report to the police concerning any person
suffering from an injury inflicted by a knife, and
the officer who was present during the search was
not required to close his eyes to the contraband he
discovered merely because the initial purpose of
the search was merely to learn the patient's
identity.
Search and Seizure-Ohio v. Price, 80 Sup. Ct.
1463 (1960). Defendant was convicted of failing to
admit municipal housing inspectors into his home
in violation of a municipal ordinance. On a petition
for habeas corpus, defendant contended that the
ordinance authorizing housing inspectors to enter
his home without a search warrant was unconsti-
tutional under the fourteenth amendment. By an
evenly divided Court, the decision was affirmed
ex necessitate. The four Justices who would have
reversed the decision-the Chief Justice and
Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan-felt that
this case went further than Frank v. Alaryland,
359 U.S. 360 (1960), because in the Frank case the
inspector was looking for a specific violation, while
here the inspectors had no such basis for their
inspection; the four Justices who would have
affirmed expressed no opinion.
Sexual Assault-State v. Dobbins, 167 N.E.2d
916 (Ohio 1960). Defendant was convicted under
Orno RZv. CODE ANI. §2903.01 (Baldwin 1958)
which states that, "No person over the age of
eighteen years shall assault a child under the age
of sixteen years, and willfully take indecent and
improper liberties with person of such child
.... " On appeal, defendant contended that
proof of an assault, in the classic sense of a threat
of physical injury coupled with a present ability
to inflict the same, was a necessary element of the
offense charged. The Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that proof of an actual assault is not
required since the act of taking indecent and
improper liberties with a child under 16 by a
person over 18, even with the child's consent,
constitutes sufficient proof of an "assault" within
the meaning of §2903.01. One judge dissented.
Sexual Psychopathy-People v. Nastasio, 168
N.E.2d 728 (Ill. 1960). Defendant was found to be
a sexually dangerous person and was committed
to the custody of the Director of Public Safety for
confinement and treatment. On appeal, defendant
contended that the admission in evidence of two
depositions taken in his absence violated ILL.
CONST. art. II, §9, which provides that in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and to meet
the witnesses face to face. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that although the Illinois Sexually
Dangerous Persons Act adopts the general struc-
ture of the state's Civil Practice Act, the nature
of the hearing under the former Act so closely
resembles a criminal prosecution that in order to
avoid constitutional problems and doubts as to its
19611
